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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BETTE WYCALIS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH,
and WARREN H. CURLIS, Its
President; CITY FEDERAL
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION;
U.S. TITLE OF UTAH, Trustee;
CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC.,
Beneficiary; R.M. WALL; GARY
L. MEREDITH and LYLE G.
MEREDITH; ED MAASS; RANDY
KRANTZ, B. BRAD CHRISTENSON,
DEBRA S. CHRISTENSON; R & C
ASSOCIATES; ROY L. MILLER;
SHARON L. MILES, and JOHN
DOES I through X,

Supreme Cou t Case No.
(Utah Court of Appeals
No. (88003 (A)-CA)

Defendants/Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This petition for a writ of certiorari is sought
because the decision of the Court of Appeals below, in one
broad stroke and in conflict with legal principles established
by this Court, imposes a duty on persons to anticipate criminal
activity of third parties and vitiates the reliability of
properly acknowledged commercial documents.

The ramifications

of this decision are serious and substantial for the entire
-1-

business and legal community.

Therefore, the following

questions are presented by petitioners for review by this Court
should this petition for a writ of certiorari be granted:
1.

Does a trustee under a deed of trust satisfy its

duty of care to the beneficiary when it executes and records a
deed of reconveyance of the trust property in good faith
reliance on an acknowledged request for reconveyance?
2.

Does a trustee under a deed of trust owe the

beneficiary any duty to foresee that an acknowledged request
for reconveyance of the trust property is a forgery?
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals may be found
as No. 880030(A)-CA of the records of the Utah Court of Appeals
and as Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, et al., 116 Utah Adv.
Rep. 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
OF COURT
This petition is brought before the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah pursuant to Rule 42 et seg. of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court.

The decision for which review is

sought was entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 29,
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1989.

Petitioners* request for a rehearing was denied by the

Court of Appeals on September 26, 1989.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTE
The interpretation of the following statute is
relevant to this matter:
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1953) Satisfaction
of obligation secured by trust
deed—Reconveyance of trust property.
When the obligation secured by any
trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee
shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property.
The reconveyance may designate the grantee
therein as "the person or persons entitled
thereto." The beneficiary under such trust
deed shall deliver to the trustor or his
successor in interest the trust deed and the
note or other evidence of the obligation so
satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust
deed who refuses to request a reconveyance
from the trustee for a period of thirty days
after written demand therefor is made by the
trustor or his successor in interest shall
be liable to the trustor or his successor in
interest, as the case may be, for double
damages resulting from such refusal, or such
trustor or his successor in interest may
bring an action against the beneficiary and
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the
trust property and in such action the
judgment of the court shall be that the
trustee reconvey the trust property and that
the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his
successor in interest, as the case may be,
the costs of suit including a reasonable
attorney's fee and all damages resulting
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from the refusal of the beneficiary to
request a reconveyance as hereinabove
provided. [Emphasis added,]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case is before this Court on a petition for a writ
of certiorari.

Plaintiff successfully appealed to the Utah

Court of Appeals from the trial court's summary judgment
dismissing her Complaint against petitioners here, Guardian
Title Company of Utah and Warren H. Curlis.

The Court of

Appeals decision was entered on August 29, 1989. A copy of
this decision is attached as Addendum I.

The Trial Court

Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment to Guardian and
Curlis was signed by the Honorable David E. Roth on October 21,
1985.

R. at 520-2.

A copy of the Memorandum Decision is

attached as Addendum II. The trial court's judgment was
entered on March 17, 1986.

R. at 589-90.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about July 1, 1980, defendants Randy Krantz

and B. Brad Christenson purchased from plaintiff Bette Wycalis
a piece of real property located in Helper, Utah.
434-5.
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R. at 384,

2.
plaintiff.

The sale of the property was financed in part by
Defendants Randy Krantz, B. Brad Christenson, Debra

S. Christenson and R. & C Associates ("R & C") executed a
promissory note in favor of plaintiff and her mother, Eva R.
Robertson, in the amount of $61,800.

R. at 1, 384-5, 434. A

copy of the promissory note is attached as Addendum III.
3.

To secure plaintiffs loan, R & C pledged as

collateral certain real property it owned located in Weber
County.

R. at 385, 435.
4.

The lien created in favor of plaintiff is

evidenced by a deed of trust naming R & C Associates as trustor
and plaintiff and Eva Robertson as beneficiaries.
435.

R. at 385,

A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Addendum IV.
5.

Eva Robertson, who is plaintiffs mother, has

assigned to plaintiff her interest in both the promissory note
and the trust deed.
6.

R. at 385, 435.

Guardian Title Company acted as trustee under the

deed of trust.

It played no other role in the transaction.

R. at 385, 435.
7.

On or about December 18, 1980, Guardian, as

trustee, received a written, acknowledged Request for Full
Reconveyance of the property subject to the trust deed,
apparently signed by plaintiff and Eva Robertson.

-5-

R. at 385,

436.

A copy of the Request for Full Reconveyance is attached

as Addendum V.
8.

Upon receiving the acknowledged Request for

Reconveyance, Guardian complied with the request by executing
and recording a Deed of Reconveyance of the property subject to
the deed of trust.

The Deed of Reconveyance was executed by

Guardian's President, Warren H. Curlis.

R. at 386, 436

A copy

of the Deed of Reconveyance is attached as Addendum VI.
9.

The Request for Full Reconveyance states that the

debt secured by the deed of trust "has been fully paid and
satisfied . . . ."
10.

R. at 404; Addendum V.

Guardian took no further steps to ascertain

whether plaintiff, the beneficiary under the deed of trust, had
been paid, prior to executing and recording the Deed of
Reconveyance, other than to ascertain that the Request for Full
Reconveyance was properly acknowledged.

R. at 386, 436-7;

Curlis Deposition, pp. 40, 42-3.
11.

Plaintiff alleges that the Request for

Reconveyance was a forgery and that neither she nor Eva
Robertson signed it.

R. at 386, 437; Wycalis Deposition,

pp. 81-2. Guardian assumed, for purposes of its motion for
summary judgment below, R. at 386, appeal and assumes for
purposes of this petition only, that the Request for
Reconveyance is a forgery.
-6-

12.

Guardian acted in good faith in executing and

recording the deed of reconveyance in reliance upon the
acknowledged request for reconveyance.

There is no claim or

evidence whatsoever of any improper motive on Guardian's part
in this case, or that Guardian had reason to know that the
Request for Reconveyance was forged.

R. at 386; Wycalis

Deposition, p. 92.
13.

Over the past few years Guardian has, in the

capacity of trustee under deeds of trust, executed literally
hundreds of deeds of reconveyance based on written requests for
reconveyance.

Except for the instance alleged in this lawsuit,

Guardian knows of no other request for reconveyance submitted
to it that has been forged.
14.

R. at 386-7, 399-40.

When the deed of reconveyance was recorded by

Guardian, plaintiff lost the benefit of the real property
collateral securing her loan to defendants Krantz and the
Christensons.
15.

R. at 387, 436.
After the deed of reconveyance was recorded, a

process virtually identical to that described above occurred
again; plaintiff became the beneficiary under another deed of
trust, describing a different piece of property, under which
Guardian was also the trustee.

After this deed of trust had

been recorded, Guardian received another acknowledged request
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for reconveyance of the property subject to this trust deed,
which also had apparently been signed by plaintiff and Eva
Robertson,

Guardian accordingly executed and recorded a deed

of reconveyance of this property, as it had done in response to
the first acknowledged request.

R. at 437-8.

Plaintiff

claims, however, she had no knowledge of events relating to the
later trust deed.

R. at 438.

Further, plaintiff "does not

have, nor does she claim, any interest in the substituted
security."

Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENTS

This petition for a writ of certiorari is sought
because the decision of the Court of Appeals, in conflict with
the decisions of this Court, imposes a duty on persons to
anticipate criminal activity of third parties.

The decision of

the Court of Appeals also vitiates the reliability of
acknowledged commercial documents, causing certain and serious
consequences for the entire business and legal community that
as a matter of course relies on such acknowledgments.

Thus,

this petition for writ of certiorari is made to this Court upon
the following specific grounds:
1.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is in

conflict with legal principles established by this Court;
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2.

The Court of Appeals improperly raised arguments

not raised by plaintiff and then resolved them in her favor; and
3.

The issues here involve important questions of

state law that should be resolved by this Court*
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN
CONFLICT WITH OTHER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.
In ruling that this case must be remanded to resolve
factual issues that precluded the trial court's entry of
summary judgment, the Court of Appeals did not appear to
directly address Guardian's argument that it owed no duty to
plaintiff to foresee a deliberate criminal act.

Under Utah law

it is clear that one has no duty to foresee and act upon a
deliberate criminal act perpetrated by another.

Accordingly,

Guardian submits that as a matter of law that it cannot be
liable to plaintiff in this action.

Moreover, the contrary

ruling by the Court of Appeals creates a conflict with the
decision of this court in Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah
1977), which held there was no duty to anticipate and act upon
the criminal conduct of another.

-9-

In this case, plaintiff alleges that some third party
forged her name to an acknowledged request for reconveyance
that was presented to Guardian, and upon which Guardian relied
to execute a deed of reconveyance of plaintiff's trust
property.

Plaintiff claims Guardian is liable to her for

acting in reliance on such an apparently forged, but
nonetheless properly acknowledged, request for reconveyance.
As Guardian argued in its initial brief, it is hornbook law
that one has no duty to foresee such criminal misconduct of
third parties.
In Gray v. Scott, supra, the plaintiff in a wrongful
death action appealed from a jury verdict in favor of
defendant.

In Gray, the decedent had been a guest at a New

Year's Eve party at the defendant Beehive Elks Lodge.

During

the party, he got into a fight with another guest, Scott, at
which point the lodge manager intervened and the parties
departed.

After both parties had left, the manager was told

there had been a shooting outside in the alley.

Neither the

manager nor anyone else made any investigation.

Later, both

the decedent and Scott returned to the party, and Scott shot
and killed the decedent.
Plaintiff brought suit against Scott as well as the
lodge, asserting that the lodge, after it became aware of a
scuffle between the decedent and Scott and a shooting incident
-10-

in the alley, owed a legal duty to the decedent to take steps
to prevent the fatal shooting from occurring.
After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the
defendant lodge, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial
court had erred in giving the following instruction:
You are instructed that a private lodge or
association, as well as its officers, has no
duty to anyone to anticipate that a crime
will be committed by another person, and to
act upon that belief.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument.

Even

though the lodge manager was aware of a shooting incident in
the alley, and thus the imminent risk of serious injury to
those at the party, the Court held that the foregoing
instruction properly stated Utah law:

H

[I]t was not error to

instruct that defendants had no duty to anticipate the
commission of the subject crime."

Id. at 78 (emphasis added).

The rule declared in Gray v. Scott should have
disposed of the issue before the Court of Appeals in the
instant case as a matter of law.

In Gray, the defendant lodge

manager was on notice of a specific and grave risk of harm to
plaintiff and other guests.

There had been a shooting right
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outside his party.

One might, in such a situation, reasonably

foresee a shooting inside the party.

Yet, the Court there held

that defendant owed no duty to anticipate and protect plaintiff
from the defendant's criminal act.
The record in this case, quite to the contrary,
indicates that Guardian had no notice whatsoever of any risk
that plaintiff might be victimized by a criminal act.

Instead,

in reliance on a properly acknowledged request for
reconveyance, Guardian performed the duties imposed on it by
the Utah Code and reconveyed the trust property.

It never had

any reason to believe or suspect that the request was not
authentic.
In light of these uncontroverted facts, any forgery of
the request was unforeseeable by Guardian as a matter of law.
As the record shows, Guardian has executed literally hundreds
of deeds of reconveyance based on written requests for
reconveyance.

On no other occasion has there ever been a

forged request.

R. at 399-400.

This criminal forgery was

completely unforeseeable to Guardian; under Gray v. Scott,
Guardian owed no legal duty to protect plaintiff against it.
See also Respondents' Brief on Appeal, pp. 28-37.
bar cannot be distinguished from Gray v. Scott.

The case at
The Court of

Appeals decision to the contrary creates a conflict with Gray
v. Scott on the issue of what duty exists to anticipate and act
-12-

upon the criminal conduct of third parties. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should resolve this conflict.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY RAISED
ISSUES NOT RAISED BY PLAINTIFF AND RELIED ON
ISSUES PLAINTIFF RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals raised arguments
not made by the plaintiff and resolved them in plaintiffs
favor.

The Court of Appeals also relied on arguments plaintiff

raised for the first time on appeal. All this was done in
contradiction of the well-established rule that appellate
courts will not consider matters raised for the first time on
appeal.

Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d

754, 758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
Despite plaintiff's express argument to the trial
court and on appeal that the case could and should be resolved
as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals determined plaintiff
should be allowed to proceed to trial.

Plaintiff did not raise

this argument on her own behalf and the Court of Appeals should
not have raised it for her and then used the argument to
dispose of the appeal in plaintiffs favor.
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The Court of AppeaLs also implicitly determined there
were issues for trial concerning whether Guardian satisfied the
proper standard of care in reconveying pursuant to a forged
request and by not requiring plaintiff as beneficiary to
surrender the original promissory note prior to reconveyance.
Plaintiff raised these arguments for the first time on appeal,
see Guardian's Brief at pp. 13, 25, 34, and thus they were
improperly considered by the Court of Appeals.
POINT III
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS RAISES
IMPORTANT STATE LAW ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE
RESOLVED BY THIS COURT.
Apart from considerations of conflicting decisions and
improperly-raised arguments, a writ of certiorari should issue
because this case raises serious questions of state law that
should be resolved by this court.

These significant questions

of law focus primarily on the duty of a party to anticipate the
criminal activity of a third party and on the right of a
trustee to rely and act on a properly acknowledged document.
The first question is discussed extensively under
Point I, supra.

As noted above, this court has declared in

Gray v. Scott, supra, that there is no duty to foresee criminal
acts of a third party.

This rule is consistent with the
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 448 (1965), which provides as
follows:
The act of a third person in committing an
intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of harm to another resulting
therefrom, although the actor's negligent
conduct created a situation which afforded
an opportunity to the third person to commit
such a tort or crime, unless the actor at
the time of his negligent conduct realized
or should have realized the likelihood that
such a situation might be created, and that
a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
Moreover, numerous decisions in other jurisdictions apply this
rule, holding as a matter of law that one owes no duty to
anticipate the intentionally tortious or criminal acts of a
third party.

See, e.g., Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority, 507 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981);
Citizens State Bank v. Martin, 609 P.2d 670, 676-7 (Kansas
1980); Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School District, 595 P.2d
1017, 1022-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).

The Court of Appeals1

decision to the contrary should be reviewed and revised to
reflect established Utah law.
Concerning the second significant question, the
reliability of acknowledgments, the Court of Appeals1 decision
effectively prevents anyone in the business or legal community

-15-

from safely relying on acknowledged documents.

The trial

court's holding, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, is
clearly correct.

The purpose of an acknowledgement is to place

a stamp of authenticity on a document so that parties may
thereafter, without further inquiry, reasonably rely on the
document's genuineness.

In granting Guardian's motion for

summary judgment, the trial court properly recognized that
because the request for reconveyance was properly acknowledged,
Guardian was entitled to presume the document was authentic,
and to act accordingly.
Utah law declares in many places the reliability that
as a matter of law, may be presumed from the acknowledgement of
a document.

For example, in Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker Bank &

Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah 1952), this Court held that the
acknowledgement of a document creates a strong presumption of
its genuineness:
This presumption should not be regarded
lightly, but should be given great weight.
The authorities generally hold that the
effect of such certificate of
acknowledgement will not be overthrown by a
mere preponderance of the evidence, but it
must be clear and convincing.
Id. at 694; Accord Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d
1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1977); Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v.
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Davis, 611 P.2d 711, 712 (Utah 1980); State ex rel. First Trust
& Savings Bank v. Easlev, 140 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tenn. 1940) ("A
certificate of acknowledgement is an act which must in the
nature of things be relied on with confidence by men of
business."); State ex rel. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v.
Otto, 276 S.W. 96, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) ("It is well settled
that one is entitled to rely upon a notary certificate and is
not required to doubt the truth of the certificate and go out
and verify its statement.").
Acknowledged documents not only carry a heavy
presumption of genuineness, they are also self-authenticating
under the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That is, under Rule 902(8)

of the Utah Rules of Evidence, an acknowledged document is,
without any further proof, what it purports to be.

The Notes

of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
from which the new Utah Rules were taken, state that
acknowledged documents, as well as other documents set out in
Rule 902, are admissible without foundational testimony as to
their authenticity "because practical considerations reduce the
possibility of unauthenticity to a very small dimension."
R. Evid. 902 Advisory Committee Notes.

Fed.

The Notes further

state, with specific reference to acknowledged documents, that
"[i]f this authentication suffices for documents of the
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importance of those affecting titles, logic scarcely permits
denying this method when other kinds of documents are
involved,M

Fed, R. Evid. 902(8) Advisory Committee Notes.

Finally, and significantly, acknowledgement of any
document affecting real estate entitles it to be recorded:
A certificate of the acknowledgement of
any conveyance, or of the proof of the
execution thereof as provided in this title,
signed and certified by the officer taking
the same as provided in this title, shall
entitle such conveyance, with the
certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be
recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which the real estate is
situated.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1953).

In short, under Utah law the

acknowledgement of a document constitutes the indicia of
authenticity that the county recorder is entitled to rely on
before recording a document.
The above authorities demonstrate the great weight
accorded to acknowledged documents under Utah law.

They carry

a presumption of reliability that can be overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence; they may be relied on by judges and
juries as presumptively authentic; and finally, the county
recorder may rely on their genuineness.

Furthermore, people

throughout the real estate industry in this state do and must
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rely on the presumptive authenticity of acknowledged documents
for that system to function effectively.

R. at 393.

The Court of Appeals' decision threatens the effective
functioning of this system.

Guardian submits that, like a

judge admitting evidence or the county recorder recording a
document, it was entitled as a matter of law to rely on the
genuineness of the request for reconveyance submitted to it.
Indeed, it is evident that the very purpose of acknowledgements
is to permit parties, such as Guardian, to presume the
authenticity of acknowledged documents without further inquiry
into or evidence of their genuineness.

If, as is the result

reached by the Court of Appeals, Guardian and others like it
could not so rely, the salutary purposes advanced by the
acknowledgement of documents would be completely undermined;
acknowledgements would be rendered meaningless.

This reason

alone merits review by this Court of the decision by the Court
of Appeals.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The decision of the Court of Appeals creates a
conflict with legal principles established in decisions of this
Court and is based on improperly raised arguments. Moreover,
the decision portends serious detrimental consequences for the
business and legal community by requiring the anticipation of
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criminal acts by third parties and by vitiating the reliability
of acknowledged documents.

Thus, this case involves important

issues that are best decided by this Court.

Accordingly,

petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their
petition for a writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of October, 1989.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

David R. Mtfney
Michael Patrle^O',Brien
Attorneys forPetitioners
Guardian Title Company of Utah
and Warren H. Curlis
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
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court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion
filed herein. Each party shall bear their own costs of this appeal.
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Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Bette Wycalis, formerly the beneficiary under a trust
deed, appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment
terminating her action against Guardian Title of Utah, the
trust deed trustee, and its president, Warren Curlis. This
appeal was consolidated with another which arose from a
separate judgment entered in the same case. However, this
opinion treats only the Wycalis appeal. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.

FACTS
In July 1980, Wycalis sold Randy Krantz and Brad and
Debra Christenson a parcel of real estate located in Helper,
Utah. A promissory note dated July 1, 1980, payable to Wycalis
and her mother, Eva Robertson, was delivered to Wycalis as
partial payment for the Helper property.1 The makers of the
promissory note were R & C Associates, Krantz, and the
Christensons. The note was secured by a standard, short form
trust deed dated June 26, 1980. The trust deed, signed only by
R & C Associates, was properly executed and created a lien in
Wycalis*s favor on a parcel of Weber County property owned by
R & C Associates. Guardian Title was named as trustee under
the trust deed.
Wycalis received payments on the note from August 1980
through December 1982, at which time all payments ceased,
leaving the note substantially unpaid. Wycalis then contacted
Guardian to enforce her rights under the trust deed. Guardian
informed Wycalis that on December 26, 1980, the Weber County
property had been reconveyed to the trustor, R & C Associates,
pursuant to a request for reconveyance allegedly bearing
Wycalis*s signature. Wycalis protested this divestment of her
security interest in the property. Subsequent investigation
revealed that Wycalis's signature had been forged on the
request for reconveyance which Guardian had received and relied
on in reconveying the trust deed property.
The forged request for reconveyance was acknowledged by a
notary who was either duped or corrupted. This document was
accompanied by a letter requesting the substitution of a trust
deed on different property as security for the promissory
note. 2 Wycalisfs signature was also forged on this letter.
1. On March 31, 1983, Eva Robertson assigned her interest in
the promissory note to Wycalis.
2. Following the reconveyance of the original trust deed and
pursuant to the letter's instructions, Guardian recorded the
substituted trust deed in favor of Wycalis. This second deed
encumbered a parcel of property different from the Weber County
parcel initially encumbered. Thereafter, this second trust
deed was reconveyed by Guardian after it received yet another
forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis does not claim any
interest in the property purportedly secured by the subsequent
trust deed nor does she claim any damages arising from its
reconveyance.

Upon receiving the two forged documents, Guardian did not
contact Wycalis to verify her request, nor did it require
delivery of the original promissory note or trust deed,
although the request for reconveyance recited the note had been
paid and erroneously indicated these documents were attached.3
Wycalis filed a complaint against Guardian, Curlis,
Krantz, the Christensons, and a number of other parties not
involved in this or the related appeal. Wycalis claimed that
Guardian Title breached its duty as trustee by reconveying the
trust deed property and releasing her corresponding security
interest based on a forged request for reconveyance. Wycalis
also sought a judgment against Krantz and the Christensons for
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. The trial court
entered summary judgment against Wycalis and in favor of
Guardian. The trial court also entered summary judgment in
favor of Wycalis and against Krantz and the Christensons for
the unpaid balance of the promissory note. As indicated, both
judgments have been appealed, but we treat only the former in
this opinion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The procedural history of Wycalis's claim against
Guardian is important to an understanding of our decision and
merits detailed review.
Prior to Guardian's successful motion for summary
judgment, Wycalis filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on the question of Guardian's liability. Wycalis claimed
Guardian was liable for the loss of her security interest
because the reconveyance was unauthorized. She cited several
cases in support of her argument. E.g., Huckell v. Matrancra,
160 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1979); Dovle v. Surety Title &
Guar. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. App. 1968); Jeanese, Inc. v.
Surety Title & Guar. Co., 1 Cal. Rptr. 752 (Cal. App. 1959).
Guardian's response was, primarily, to distinguish those cases
from the instant case, claiming that they involved situations
where no authorization had been received by the trustee while
3. The reference to the note being ,paid and to these documents
being attached is curious, not only because they were not
attached, but also because a request to substitute security is
altogether inconsistent with a representation that the note has
been paid.

Guardian had received apparent, acknowledged authorization to
reconvey the property• Since Hthe acknowledgment of a document
gives rise to a presumption of its genuineness," Guardian
argued, a factual question existed concerning whether the
trustee's unquestioning reliance on that document was
consistent with the applicable duty of care. Guardian observed
that the only case relied on by Wycalis involving a forged
request for reconveyance was not resolved as a matter of law
but instead had been submitted to the trier of fact. See
Stephans v. Herman. 37 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Cal. App. 1964).
Guardian emphasized the need for -evidence as to the standard
of care in the local title company industry" before it could
properly be determined that Guardian breached its duty.
Wycalis's response
litigants. She conceded
the inescapable presence
corresponding need for a
motion.

was uncharacteristic of modern
the validity of Guardian's argument/
of material factual questions/ and the
trial. Accordingly/ she withdrew her

It was several months later that Guardian filed its own
motion for summary judgment/ now changing its tack
considerably. Guardian argued that it owed no duty to foresee
and protect against criminal acts# such as forgery-/ and that/
in any event/ it was entitled to rely on the acknowledged
request as a matter of law. In her response, Wycalis
unfortunately failed to remind the court of Guardian's prior
concession of unavoidable factual issues and of the need for
standard-of-care-in-the-industry evidence, which had not been
offered by Guardian in support of its motion.4 Nor did
4. The record contains two affidavits submitted by Guardian
which merit comment in this regard. The first affidavit is
that of Craig Thomsen/ president of a local title company/
which was submitted by Guardian in its opposition to Wycalis's
motion for summary judgment but not relied on in support of its
own motion. Moreover/ Guardian contended that Thomsen's
affidavit demonstrated the need for a trial and the impropriety
of Wycalis's motion/ not that Thomsen's affidavit established
the standard of care as a matter of law. The second affidavit
is that of Warren Curlis# which is also insufficient to
establish the standard of care as a matter of law. Curlis does
not attempt to identify any industry standard in his affidavit/
but merely states his own personal experience and the fact that
he had not previously encountered a forged request for
reconveyance. Thus, these affidavits do not establish that
Guardian met the applicable standard of care as a matter of law.
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Wycalis directly refute Guardian's new legal arguments.
Instead/ she too changed tack. In essence, her response was
that Guardian's new arguments were irrelevant because a forged
reconveyance, even if acknowledged, is an absolute nullity.
Thus, according to Wycalis, Guardian had, in effect, released
the security without any authority whatsoever and was therefore
liable for the loss as a matter of law.
It was in this posture of each party asserting its
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that the district
court took Guardian's motion for summary judgment under
advisement. Thereafter, the district court granted Guardian's
motion, concluding that the "great weight" afforded
acknowledged documents entitled Guardian to rely on the request
in this case since there was no showing that Guardian had any
reason to suspect a forgery. The propriety of that disposition
is the gravamen of this appeal.
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and
necessary tool in a judicial system such as ours, which strives
for the efficient and timely resolution of legal disputes.
Granting summary judgment saves the parties and the courts the
time and expense of a full-blown trial. See, e.g., Amiacs
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah
1981). However, summary judgment is appropriate only where
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). See, e.g.. Ingram v. Salt Lake City,
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Barber v. Farmers
Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Briggs v.
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Appellate
courts scrutinize summary judgments under the same standard
applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference
to the trial court's legal conclusions concerning whether the
material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what legal
result obtains. See, e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,
247 (Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d
225, 229 (Utah 1987).
[W]e consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the losing party, and
affirm only where it appears there is no

genuine dispute as to any material issues
of fact, or where, even according to the
facts as contended by the losing party,
the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Themv v. Seagull Enters., I n c . 595 P,2d 526, 528-29 (Utah
1979), See also, e.g., Barber, 751 P.2d at 251; Briggs, 740
P.2d at 283.
Every summary judgment must withstand scrutiny under the
foregoing standards, even where a trial court was confronted
with cross-motions for such relief. Despite the parties1
apparent mutual perception in such situations that the material
facts are not in dispute, it does not automatically follow that
summary disposition is appropriate.5 "Cross-motions for
summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual issues,
even though both parties contend . • . that they are entitled
to prevail because there are no material issues of fact.Amiacs, 635 P.2d at 55. See also Diamond T Utah, Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705, 706
(1968). Rather, cross-motions may be viewed as involving a
contention by each movant that no genuine issue of fact exists
under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no
dispute remains under the theory advanced by its adversary.
&££, £*£[., DeStefano v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1123,
1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In effect, each cross-movant
implicitly contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, but that if the court determines otherwises, factual
disputes exist which preclude judgment as a matter of law in
favor of the other side.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
The summary judgment challenged here disposes of what
amounts to a negligence claim by Wycalis against Guardian. But
see note 9, infra. Specifically, Wycalis contends that
Guardian breached its duty as trustee under the trust deed in
reconveying Wycalis1s interest without her actual
5. Although Wycalis had withdrawn her prior motion for summary
judgment and had not technically filed a cross-motion, the
situation was essentially one of cross-motions since her
response to Guardian*s motion was that she, not Guardian, was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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authorization. As a general proposition, summary judgment is
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and
should be employed "only in the most clear-cut case.- Ingram,
733 P.2d at 126. See also Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney,
706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Williams v. Melbv,
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170,
172 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436
(Utah 1982). Of particular concern is the precept that
"[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required
standard of care is a question of fact for the jury." Jackson
v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). See also Ingram, 733
P.2d at 127; Bowen, 656 P.2d at 437; FMA Acceptance Co. v.
Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1979); Robison
v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876, 877 (1964).
Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate unless the
applicable standard of care is "fixed by law," Elmer v.
Vanderford, 445 P.2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968); see also Chicago,
Rock Island and Pac. R.R. v. Hawes, 424 P.2d 6, 10 (Okla.
1967), and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as
to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. See
Jackson, 645 P.2d at 615; Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d
292, 431 P.2d 126, 129 (1967); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d
1154, 1156 (Ct. App. 1989). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that since summary disposition denies the losing
party "the privilege of a trial," art. I, § 11 of the Utah
Constitution6 suggests that "doubt or uncertainty as to the
questions of negligence . . . should be resolved in favor of
granting . . . a trial." Butler v. Sports Haven Int'l, 563
P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). £££ also Anderson, 671 P.2d at
172; Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978).
With the foregoing standards in mind, we must determine
whether Wycalis's negligence claim was properly resolved by the
district court as a matter of law, given the posture of the
case.
IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR GUARDIAN
There are two fundamental problems with the summary
judgment at issue in this appeal. First, we cannot agree that
the standard of care owed by Guardian to Wycalis is "fixed by
6. Art. I, § 11 is commonly known as the "open courtsprovision.
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law" or even conducive to an Has a matter of law"
determination, especially in the absence of uncontroverted
standard-of-the-industry evidence.
It is true that the applicable standard of care in a
given case may be established, as a matter of law, by
legislative enactment or prior judicial decision. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 285 (1965). See also Elmer v. Vanderford,
445 P.2d 613, 614 (Wash. 1968). Nonetheless, Guardian has not
demonstrated that the standard of care owed by a trustee under
a trust deed when presented with a request for reconveyance has
been established in either of these ways. Thus, we are not
convinced that the applicable standard has yet been established
in Utah "as a matter of law."7 Accordingly, the standard
must be established factually in the course of ultimate

7. We necessarily reject Wycalis6s contention that trust deed
trustees are subject to what in essence would be a strict
liability standard. In this regard, Wycalis relies on Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1986), which provides, with our emphasis,
that "rwlhen the obligation secured by any trust deed has been
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request; by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." Wycalis suggests
this language means the trustee has no authority to reconvey
property while the obligation is unpaid, and if the trust
property is reconveyed in such circumstances, the trustee is
strictly liable to the beneficiary. Such a construction is at
odds with actual commercial practice under which a beneficiary
is entitled to have the property reconveyed upon his or her
instruction, whether or not the obligation has been paid,
either because the beneficiary and the obligor agree to
substitute other security, upon receipt of additional
consideration, as part of a loan work-out, or simply because
the beneficiary feels like it. A reading of § 57-1-33 in its
entirety suggests that it is intended to operate only as a
procedural guide for trustees. We note that in drafting
§ 57-1-33 the Legislature was very explicit and went to great
lengths to define the duties of the beneficiary and the
resulting liability for breach of those duties. In light of
this observation, we cannot agree that the Legislature intended
the first eleven words of § 57-1-33 to impose strict liability
on trustees. If such an onerous burden was intended, we think
the Legislature would have explicitly said so rather than leave
the matter for inference.
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resolution of this case, with an emphasis on standard-of-carein-the-industry evidence.8
As discussed above, a trial court may not grant summary
judgment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on the
negligence issue, including resolving the applicable standard
of care, unless it correctly concludes that the jury could not
reasonably find the defendant's conduct to be negligent.9
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 comment f at 22
(1965). We hold that a jury could reasonably conclude the
standard of care owed by Guardian to Wycalis required more than
unquestioning reliance on the forged request, even though
8. Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating
the standard of care applicable here. Where the average person
has little understanding of the duties owed by particular
trades or professions, expert testimony must ordinarily be
presented to establish the standard of care. For instance,
expert testimony has been required to establish the standard of
care for medical doctors, Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817,
821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); architects, Nauman v. Harold K.
Beecher & Assocs.. 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610, 615 (1970);
engineers, National Housing Indust., Inc. v. E. L. Jones Dev.
£o., 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ct. App. 1978);
insurance brokers, cf. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co.. 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 403 (1984)
(establishing standard of care "may require expert testimony");
and professional estate executors. Estate of Beach. 125 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en banc). But see
Daniel, Mann. Johnson & Mendenhall v. Hilton Hotels Corp.. 642
P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1982) (expert testimony not required to
prove negligence of surveyor).
9. Our emphasis on "negligence" analysis should not be taken
as an implicit rejection of Wycalis's contention that a trust
deed trustee is a fiduciary held to a standard higher than one
of ordinary care. On the contrary, courts have recognized that
a trust deed trustee is a fiduciary. See, e.g., Mclntvre v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co.. 658 Supp. 944, 950 (D. Alaska 1986);
Hoffman v. First Bond & Mort. Co.. 116 Conn. 320, 164 A. 656,
658 (1933). See also Spruill v. Ballard. 58 F.2d 517, 519
(D.C. App. 1932) ("trustee named in a deed of trust to secure a
loan sustains a fiduciary relation to the debtor as well as the
creditor") (cited with approval in Blodaett v. Martsch, 590
P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978)). Nonetheless, the fiduciary nature
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apparently acknowledged,10 as the basis for reconveying the
beneficiary's interest. In short, Guardian was correct when it
asserted, in opposing Wycalis°s prior motion for summary
judgment, that the standard of care could not be established,
as a practical matter, without a trial.
Second, and closely related to the point above, we
believe that a jury could also reasonably conclude that
Guardian breached whatever duty it owed Wycalis even though it
relied on an acknowledged document. Although the posture of
this case admittedly leaves us with some doubt as to whether
Wycalis can convince a jury that she is entitled to prevail,
consistent with precedent we resolve that doubt in favor of
permitting Wycalis an opportunity to proceed to trial. See
Butler, 563 P.2d at 1246-47.

(Footnote 9 continued)
of the trustee's responsibility really goes to the standard of
care to which a trustee is held, rather than to supplant
negligence analysis. See, e.g., Estate of Beach, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 542 P.2d 994, 1001 (1975) (en banc) (fiduciary held
to "more stringent standards,- consistent with rule that
"[tlhose undertaking to render expert services in the practice
of a profession or trade are required to have and apply the
skill, knowledge and competence ordinarily possessed by their
fellow practitioners under similar circumstances, and failure
to do so subjects them to liability for negligence**).
10. It is of course true that acknowledged documents have a
special status in certain contexts. Properly acknowledged
documents may be admitted into evidence without other evidence
of their authenticity. See Utah R. Evid. 902(8). Subject to
certain exceptions, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-3 (1986), only
acknowledged documents are entitled to recordation. Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-1 (1986). It does not necessarily follow, however,
that a trust deed trustee can be said to have fully discharged
its duty of care in reconveying property in response to a
written submission which includes an acknowledged request for
reconveyance.
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CONCLUSION
The summary judgment is reversed. We remand for trial or
such other proceedings as may be appropriate. The parties
shall bear their own costs of this appeal.

Grego;ry K. Orme, Judge

CUR:

^&*-^/
L^J^^UA^J^
-^stv*.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Russell W. B e n ^ T o u * ^ ^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BETTE WYCALIS,
>

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,

3
i

Case No.

88766

)

Defendant.

After considering defendants Guardian Title Company and
Warren H. Curlis1 motion for summary
affidavits

and

memoranda

judgment and reviewing the

presented

by

both

plaintiff

and

defendants, the Court rules as follows:
The Court finds that, based upon the statement of both
parties, there are no material disputed facts.
Defendants,
trustee,

executed

acknowledged

a

request

Guardian
deed

of

Title

and

Warren

reconveyance

(purportedly

from

H.

after

plaintiff)

Curlis,

as

receiving

an

stating

that

the debt had been paid and that the property could be reconveyed.
The acknowledged request was a forged document, the debt had not
been paid, and plaintiff was divested of her security
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent

interest.

in not contacting

plaintiff prior to the reconveyance to confirm that the debt had
in fact been paid.
ADDENDUM II
(xiv)
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The issue is whether a trustee is entitled to rely on a
writtenf acknowledged request stating that the debt has been paid
and

requesting

that

the property

be

reconveyed

or whether

the

trustee has a duty to take further steps to confirm that the debt
has in fact been satisfied prior to the reconveyance.
Defendant

argues

and

gives

authority

for

the position

that he had no duty to foresee the criminal acts of another and
was entitled

to rely on an acknowledged

document.

Defendant's

authorities suggest that, under Utah law and Rules of Evidence,
acknowledged

documents

are accorded

that they may be relied upon by

great weight

judges and

to the extent

juries as presump-

tively authentic.
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in failing
to know or take steps to know that the debt had, prior to reconveyance, been paid.

Plaintiff gives authority

for the position

that a trustee will be liable when property is reconveyed without
authorization.
the

Apparently, none of plaintiff's cases deal with

issue of whether

or not a trustee

is negligent

in relying

solely on an acknowledged request.
The Court finds that Utah cases and Rules of Evidence,
which

give

great

weight

to

acknowledged

documents,

compel

a

ruling that, in a case such as this, a trustee is not negligent
in relying on an acknowledged request to reconvey property unless
the

trustee

has

reason

to believe

(xv)

the request

is forged.

No
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evidence has been presented
have

been

suspicious

of

to suggest

the

that

document;

the trustee should

therefore,

defendants'

motion for summary judgment is granted.
DATED this 2(

day of October, 1985.

r

DAVID E. ROTH, Jud^e

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this & '

day of October, 1985,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was
served upon the following:
Sherman C. Young
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 672
Pr'ovo, Utah 84602
George W. Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MC DONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant Guardian Title
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph Hatch
Attorney at Law
311 South State #320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Eric Hartman
Attorney at Law
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utafr^ 8 4 1 0 6 /
(

INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY NuTE
* 6JL.8J0fl.JML.... -

i!iiJ... .i

For value received, I, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of
EVA ROBERTSON
at

19 ..!.?.„
.BEXT.E...l^.CALIS_and

3Q8 N o r t h 4 0 0 E a s t { P a y s o n , Utah
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100

, the sum of
. . . t o o

together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date at the rate of

...9.;..™

annum, in lawful money of the United States, in monthly installments of * 7.5.6 ...5 2
....i.s.t
19 ...8..0....

day of each and every month beginning with the ....„.?..*:.

_

percent per
each on the

day of ....£?JL^™T

and continuing until the whole thereof shall have been fully paid.

The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this note jointly and severally agree that if any installment is not
paid when due, that the whole of the principal sum then remaining unpaid, together with the accrued interest thereon
shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of the holder of this note, and that beginning with the date of such
default the whole of said unpaid principal shall bear interest at the rate of KXpercent per annum both, before and
after judgment.
10.5
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally consent to renewals and extensions at or after maturity hereof and waive presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice thereof, and agree to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee, together with all costs and expenses incurred- in the event that this note is placed in the
, hands of any attorney for collection.
R & CyASSOCIATES ,
/

Address M&JM^&^J&llS-J>£~.

LBX.L-^S^^Sfc4feZ.-r

Address ...9.5A..Waljden..J3ills..I>X.iv»5./
SLC,
SLC, UTAH
UTAH
Address P.. 0*. BQX
5Q2
" .J50Z

Y r i c e T Utah * "845*01

™ -

8. ••^^^-^Q^i^^K
t. ^ - 3 / s*y • /
33.
. - O aJtr-f^r '^--ns^io* ^ .

"~ '^n^l

This note and the interest thereon is secured by a Second*Trust ueect dated June 26, 1980
on property located in Weber Coujr^_fUtah_.

ADDENDUM III
(xvii)

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

sfO&

814!

•«ook 1361 not 7BI
Kb*
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SECOND

Crust gbzcb
6f,TER£D

THIS TRUST DEED is made this 26th day of
between

,19 80

R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership

whose address is

, as Trustor,

Bountiful

(Street and Number)

C MCROFILMcD

Juftt

Utah

(City)

(SUM)

GUAROIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH

, as Trustee,* and

BETTE WYCALIS and EYA ROBERTSON

, as Beneficiary

Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST WITH POWER
OF SALE, the following described property situated in

I

I

0
I

0

Weber

County, Utah.

Beginning at a point which l i e s South 0°28'07" West 949.73 feet
and North 89°31'16" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Comer of
the Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 3 33'00"
East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South ?1°03 , 35 M
West along said canal 106.85 f e e t ; thence South 89°33'00" West
209.78 feet to the East Rioht-of-Way l i n e of 1900 West S t r e e t ;
thence North 0°28*07" East along said Riqht-of-Way l i n e 39.42
feet to the point of beginning.

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way,
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments privileges and appurtenances
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 61 ,300.00
, pavable to the order of
Beneficiary at the tune*, in the maxinei and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof.
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the shove property, to pay all charges and
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit «aste, to maintain
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness secured hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee s fees for any of the services performed by Trustee
hereunder, including s reconveyance hereof.
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
R A C ASSOCIATES., a general .partnership

.Mi.

J^^lf.^^^C

Roy L. Holler

general ppartner

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Salt Lake
On the 2 6 t h

day of

June

, 19 80

t

personally appeared before me

ROY L. MILLER who being duly sworn did say that he is a general partner of R 4 C
ASSOCIATES, a general partnership and that said instrument was sioned in behalf of
said partnership by a u t h o r i t y , and said ROY L. MILLER acknowledged to me that he as
such general partner executed the same in the name of the partnership.

IIK />. Yi^cj..
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: June 28, 1981

Residing at: Kaysvilie, Utah

•NOTE Trustee must be a member of the Utah State B a r a bank building and loan associauon or savuics and
loan association authorized to do such business in Utah a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah, or a tide insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

U

REQUEST TOR FULL RECON.'YA.V

(Trustee)

TO. GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH

The undersigned is the legal owner and hclder of the Note and a"! ctrer
indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed dated t~: 26th
day of
June
19 80
recorded the
15th
day cf
My
ir poo*
Vr^fae^ _ , 1? *~

Ubl
, Page 7b\
recorcs c* ixdxxxxxjyixxxxxx ula , Said
Note, together with all otner indebtedness secured by said Trj;t De-.. r.c.s beer
fully paid and satisfied, and you are hereby re* .ested and dircrted, or oa/nert
to you af any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trjst C-.-ji, to carcel
said Note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured
by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together with the said Tryst Deed
and to reconvey, without warranty to the parties designated by tne ter*s of said
Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder in and to the property
decribed as follows:
Beginning at a point which lies South 0°28 , 07 H West 949.73 feet and North
89°3ri6" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 89°33 , 00 M East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Oavis Canal; thence South
2r03*35" West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89 o 33'00" West 209 78
feet to the East Right-of-Way line of 1900 West Street, thence North 0°2S'07 M
East along said Right-of-Way line 99.42 feet to the point of beginning.

EvaKOoertson
Dated

December 18. 1980

State of Utah

)ss
County of

^L B t n t

December
. 19 80 % personally
dav of
l^d
EVA-*dBERT50T7
wYCALlS
_the signers of tne within instrument wno auly
acknowledged to me that they executed the same

On the
appeared before me

Notary Puolic
My Commission Expires:

f*-\~t)

Residing in*

ADDENDUM V
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/*\arra/

, Utrsh
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Jlccb of Jlmuttirumicc
(Corporate Trustee)
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH
under a Trust Deed dated

, a* 2 ruMtt*

June 2 5 ,

, 19 SO

, excruu-d by

R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership
and recorded

July 15,

, 19 80

. as Trustor,
, as Entry No. 814366

.in Book 1361 ,

Page(s) 761 of the records of the County Recorder of
Weber
County. Utah,
pursuant to a written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, dors hereby recunvey, without warrantv,
to the person or persona entitled thereto, the trust property now held by it as Trustee under said
Trust Deed, which Trust Deed covers real property situated in

County,

Weber

Utah, described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point which l i e s South 0°28'07" West 949.73 feet and North
e9°3ri6 M East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt lake Base and
teridian; thence North 89°33'00" East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal;
thence South 21°03l35" West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence Soutn 89°
33'00M West 209.78 feet to the'East Right of Way line of 1900 West Street
thence North 0#28'Q7" East along said Right of Way line 99.42 feet to the
point of beginning.

Dstedthia 26th day of

Decenfcer

.19 80

Bv S^'OWA&REN H. GURU'S President
Trustee
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OPUIt
On the 26 th

take
day of

I
December

WARREN H. CURLIS
PRESI0ENT

, 19 80

, personally appeared be/uru me

, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the
of

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH

s corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of it*
by-laws (or by a resolution of its board of directors) and said
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same.
/ '

WARREN H. CURL IS
^_

V ^:i,lli/l..A .uL_
Notary Public

My Commission Expiivs: 6-28-81

Residing at:

Kaysville, Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the oMj?tS

day of October,

1989, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, to the following:
Dallas H. Young, Jr.
Sherman C. Young
IVIE AND YOUNG
48 North University
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Bette Wycalis
Joseph E. Hatch
257 East Second South
Suite 640
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Randy Krantz
Eric P. Hartman
SAMUEL KING & ASSOCIATES
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Attorney for B. Brad and Debra Christenson

mob 275/jf

FILED
SEP2 519S9
CJ«*-K c r 4 n * Tic. >rt

UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Bette WycaliS/
Plaintiff and Appellant/

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING
No. 880030-CA

v.
City Federal Savings & Loan
Association; Guardian Title
Company of Utah and Warren H.
CurliS/ its President; U.S. Title
of Utah, Trustee; City Consumer
Services/ Inc./ Beneficiary; R.M.
Wall; Gary L. Meredith and Lyle G.
Meredith; Ed Maass; Randy KrantZ/
B. Brad Christenson, Debra S.
Christenson; R & C Associates;
Roy L. Miller; Sharon L. Miles,
and John Does I through X,
Defendants and Respondents.

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Rehearing
filed by the respondents/ Guardian Title Company of Utah and
Warren H. Curlis;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the respondent's petition is denied,
Dated thi
lis

day of September, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

'MtZ

oonan/ Clerk
urt of Appeals

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on 26, September 1989 I mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING by depositing the same with the United States Mail/
postage prepaid to the following:

Joseph E. Hatch
Garrett and Sturdy
Attorneys for Krantz and Christenson
257 East 2nd South, Suite 640
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dallas H. Young, Jr.
Sherman C. Young
Ivie & Young
Attorneys for Wycalis
P. O. Box 672
48 North University Avenue
Provo, UT 84601
George W. Pratt
David R. Money
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
Attorneys for Guardian Title and Warren Curliss
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Eric P. Hartman
Attorney for Krantz and Christenson
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg.
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

DATED this 26th day of September, 1989.

Kathleen Flynn"
^
Deputy Court Clerk

